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Japan each year for two months of study and home stays. The similar program called the Japan Prefecture Program, which is a year old, brings 47 Japanese students each year to this country for one year of studies and home stays. Both programs are administered by Washington-based Youth for Understanding, an organization I have come to respect and admire.

Learning is a lifetime endeavor, and I promise you that Mitsuko and I will continue to be ardent students of America and Japanese-American relations. We are deeply grateful to all of you, as individuals and as an organization, for all you have done to make our stay here useful, rewarding and enjoyable. We are very happy to return to Japan with such fond memories of Washington and the whole 50 states of this country. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts, and we look forward to seeing you in Tokyo or in our travels.

Sayonara.●

BUDGET CUTS POSE PROBLEM FOR MASSACHUSETTS' STUDENTS

HON. JOE MOAKLEY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 26, 1985

● Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, certainly, one of the most damaging areas of budgetary cutbacks and programmatic restrictions proposed by President Reagan in his fiscal year 1986 budget is in the area of Federal student financial assistance, particularly with regard to the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. I would like to share with my colleagues the following letter from my good friend Joseph M. Cronin, president of the Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corp., about the devastating impact that these changes will have on students attending Massachusetts' independent colleges and universities. While I knew these cutbacks would be quite serious, even I was surprised at the enormous negative ramifications that will result in these postsecondary institutions. I hope that my colleagues in the Congress will realize the shortsightedness of such funding cuts and will join me in opposing the administration's proposal:

MASSACHUSETTS HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORP.,
Boston, MA, March 19, 1985.

HON. JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY,
U.S. House of Representatives, Cannon Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MOAKLEY: The Reagan Administration has proposed substantial reductions in student eligibility for a higher education loan. His budget proposal will eliminate 40,000 Massachusetts students from eligibility in order to save \$98 million.

I thought you would like to see the effect on Massachusetts students at the larger independent Massachusetts colleges and universities. The impact on U. Mass-Amherst is more than six million dollars, but the great burden of costs will be felt by those at private colleges.

The biggest surprise may be the impact on Northeastern University. Although 80 percent of their students earn a portion of their tuition through cooperative education

jobs, many must borrow the rest to pay for tuition, textbooks, room and board.

School	Loans ¹	Amount
Northeastern University	2,140	\$5,353,173
Boston College	1,452	3,793,894
Boston University	1,251	3,711,185
Harvard College	1,056	3,467,540
Bentley College	837	2,001,939
Surfco University	756	2,125,179
Wentworth College	599	1,410,511
College of the Holy Cross	468	1,110,354
Wentworth College	439	999,075
Stonehill College	433	991,343
Tufts University	418	1,080,519
Worcester Polytechnic Institute	406	894,484
Western New England College	367	922,566
Assumption College	362	843,873
Babson College	339	873,665
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	332	896,340
Brandeis University	281	674,547
Simmons College	262	648,508
Clark University	243	563,350
Springfield College	207	501,100
Smith College	191	421,562
Emerson College	190	492,078
Mount Holyoke College	186	439,970
Regis College	182	414,176
Wheaton College	176	403,650
Nichols College	174	407,071
Wellesley College	155	356,315
Williams College	140	328,592
Emmanuel College	139	299,543
American International College	131	303,518
Central New England College	131	297,760
College of Our Lady of the Elms	127	309,182
Curry College	125	288,606
Lesley College	122	329,116
Anna Maria College	105	259,547
Amherst College	104	210,510
Berklee College of Music	103	243,925
Gordon College	95	221,974
Massachusetts College of Pharmacy	89	215,854
Eastern Nazarene College	54	125,062
Wheelock College	48	116,533

¹ To students from families with adjusted gross income of more than \$32,500.

Again, these figures are for Massachusetts students only; 85 percent of Amherst College students have parents living in other states. MIT imports from other states 90 percent of its students, 75 percent of whom stay in Massachusetts and add to our famous high tech prosperity.

The most interesting fact is that 70 percent of our student loan recipients are from families with less than \$32,500 adjusted gross income. But many of these will be ineligible for loans because of the arbitrary \$4,000 cap on all sources of federal aid: Pell grants, work study, and loans. The Guaranteed Student Loan Program serves mainly low income and working class families and middle income families with two or three in college at once.

We appreciate your continued support of this program.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH M. CRONIN,
President.●

H.R. 1082 WILL IMPROVE U.S. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES BY FACILITATING CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN SOURCES

HON. BOB STUMP

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 26, 1985

● Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, the ability of the United States to collect intelligence on the intentions of hostile foreign countries depends upon the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to persuade highly placed individuals in those countries to cooperate with U.S. intelligence. The motivation for such cooperation may vary from individual to individual. However, in-

telligence sources motivated by their belief in the principles of human freedom, justice, and peace, for which the United States stands in the world, have often proved to be of the greatest intelligence value. These individuals cooperate with U.S. intelligence because they wish to contribute to the advancement of high principles of freedom and often because they hope, at the end of their U.S. intelligence service abroad, to be welcomed into the community of freedom we enjoy in the United States. Title VII of H.R. 1082 will enhance the ability of U.S. intelligence to secure the cooperation of these well-motivated, highly placed individuals abroad by permitting them, in certain circumstances, to become U.S. citizens expeditiously at the end of their intelligence service.

1. UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

To carry out its foreign intelligence collection mission, the Central Intelligence Agency depends upon human sources abroad for information and operational assistance. To secure the cooperation of a well-placed individual who can provide the needed information or assistance, the CIA officer who will work with that source must establish with him a secret relationship with three critical elements: secrecy, trust, and mutual benefit.

Secrecy is the first critical element in the relationship between the CIA and a foreign intelligence source. A potential source will cooperate with the CIA only if he believes that the secrecy of his relationship with the CIA will be protected. If he believes that the CIA cannot provide an ironclad guarantee of secrecy and deliver on that guarantee, he will not cooperate. If such secrecy is breached, the source loses his freedom, and in many parts of the world, his life. The Congress has in recent years enhanced considerably the ability of the CIA to deliver on its guarantee of secrecy in human intelligence activities by enacting the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which protects the identities of intelligence sources, and the CIA Information Act, which excludes CIA operational files from the reach of the Freedom of Information Act.

Trust is the second critical element in the relationship between the CIA and an intelligence source. The intelligence source must be confident that the CIA as an institution of the U.S. Government, and the particular CIA officers with whom he works, will deal with him honestly and fairly, will take care of his interests in the event of mishap, and will honor fully whatever promises are made to him. The CIA takes great care to maintain such trust. Breaches of this trust would alienate foreign intelligence sources, ending their cooperation with U.S. intelligence.

Mutual benefit is the third critical element in the relationship between the CIA and the intelligence source.

March 26, 1985

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

Neither U.S. intelligence nor an intelligence source will incur the risk which inheres in a clandestine intelligence relationship unless the product of the relationship is judged by both parties to be worth the risk. The U.S. Government benefits from the secret information and operational assistance the intelligence source provides. The intelligence source's benefits vary, sometimes including compensation and sometimes not. Among the most dedicated and effective intelligence sources, however, are those who only want a chance to contribute to the advancement of justice and freedom for which the United States stands and a chance to go to the United States at the end of their intelligence service, to participate in the free society which their secret service has helped to maintain.

2. ADMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TO THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF THEIR SERVICE

Under section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403b), whenever the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration determine that entry of an alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, the alien is admitted to the United States for permanent residence without regard to U.S. immigration laws. No more than 100 persons may be admitted under this special authority in any fiscal year. This special provision, enacted 36 years ago, provided clear authority to bring U.S. foreign intelligence sources into the United States for permanent residence at the end of their intelligence service. Without such a clear statute that applies notwithstanding any other laws, the CIA would be unable to promise a potential intelligence source that at the end of his secret intelligence service the United States will reward him and protect him with permanent U.S. residence.

The ability of the CIA—with the approval of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration—to offer permanent residence in the United States at the end of service contributes substantially to the CIA's ability to persuade highly-placed individuals abroad to cooperate with U.S. intelligence. A statute which would permit U.S. intelligence to offer to a key potential intelligence source U.S. citizenship at the end of his service would contribute further to the CIA's ability to persuade key personnel of hostile foreign governments to cooperate with U.S. intelligence.

3. INABILITY TO OFFER CITIZENSHIP TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AT THE END OF THEIR SERVICE

Although section 7 of the CIA Act provides extraordinary authority to all foreign intelligence sources to the United States for permanent residence, no similar statute exists which grants extraordinary authority with

respect to citizenship for such persons. Thus, U.S. intelligence cannot offer citizenship to the best potential sources, because no statute exists which provides a clear guarantee that the United States can deliver on that offer after the source performs his secret intelligence service. Regardless of the value to the United States of a source's secret intelligence service, to become a citizen after he has become a permanent U.S. resident, he must qualify under the generally applicable naturalization laws. The requirement to comply with the general naturalization laws fails to take account of the critical contribution of certain intelligence sources to the national security and also fails to take account that, in certain cases, a former intelligence source may be handicapped in qualifying for citizenship solely because of his intelligence service.

Well-placed individuals of good character in hostile countries who risk their lives and livelihood for years to provide vital intelligence to the United States, because they believe in the principles for which America stands, have proved their fitness for citizenship by that service. Risking one's life and livelihood to assist a nation because of its principles represents the highest demonstration of allegiance to that nation. A foreign intelligence source whose actions contribute substantially to the security of the United States merits special consideration for citizenship.

The citizenship laws of our ally to the north, Canada, provide a clear example of a national determination that certain service of extraordinary value may merit an expedited method for conferring citizenship on the individual performing the service. Thus, section 5(4) of Canada's Citizenship Act (1976), other provisions of which contain detailed and restrictive provisions for becoming a citizen, provides:

In order . . . to reward services of an exceptional value to Canada, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Governor in Council may, in his discretion, any person and, where such a direction is made, the Minister shall forthwith grant citizenship to the person named in the direction.

The Canadian statute provides a useful model for special citizenship consideration based on extraordinarily valuable service to the Nation.

In the absence of a provision for special consideration for U.S. citizenship of America's best intelligence sources, they must continue to qualify for citizenship under the general naturalization laws. In some cases, however, the very activity the source undertook to assist U.S. intelligence may place the source at a disadvantage in qualifying for citizenship. Thus, for example, a source who—at the urging of U.S. intelligence—remained an active member of the Communist Party of a foreign nation to report to U.S. intelligence on the party's activities, suffers due to his cooperation with U.S. intel-

ligence when he comes to the United States at the end of his service. Time spent in service to the United States as an intelligence source cannot count in the source's favor in satisfying certain waiting periods imposed by the general naturalization law. Having been a member of a Communist Party, he must wait 10 years before becoming eligible for citizenship, since the section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (U.S.C. 1424) requires that 10 years have elapsed since an individual seeking citizenship has terminated membership in a Communist Party. Thus, under current U.S. law, foreign intelligence sources who have contributed substantially to U.S. security not only receive no special treatment in the citizenship process, but may even be actively handicapped in that process because of their service.

In addition to the substantive handicaps which the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes upon intelligence sources seeking citizenship, that act imposes procedural handicaps as well. Section 316(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1427) requires that an individual seeking citizenship file a petition for naturalization in the court with jurisdiction over his place of residence. This requirement would result in a publicly available court record revealing that the source is in the United States and revealing where he has settled in the United States. The availability of such information could constitute a threat to the safety of the source, whose former country may seek to do him harm.

In some situations, such as that of Soviet MIG pilot Viktor Belenko, the executive branch has secured the citizenship consideration a source deserves by seeking a private bill in the Congress. The private bill procedure, however, lacks sufficient security to serve as a permanent solution to the problem of citizenship for key sources. The private bill procedure reveals that a source is in the United States, since the private bill must include the source's name. Moreover, the private bill procedure requires rather general dissemination in the legislative branch of information, much of which will be classified, concerning the merits of the private bill. Most importantly, the outcome of the private bill procedure is not predictable; the press of other legislative business or the timing of the bill may result in its failure to pass for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits of the private bill. The hit-or-miss nature of the private bill procedure prevents U.S. intelligence from offering the prospect of citizenship to attract key foreign sources to service for the United States, because U.S. intelligence cannot offer citizenship unless it is absolutely sure it can deliver on its offer, and it cannot be sure with the private bill procedure.

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